Hermann Weyl (1885Weyl ( -1955 was one of the greatest and most versatile mathematicians of the 20 th century. His work had a vast range, encompassing analysis, algebra, number theory, topology, differential geometry, relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and mathematical logic. He was also unusual among mathematicians in possessing acute literary and philosophical sensibilities -sensibilities to which he gave full expression in his writings. In this paper I shall use quotations from these writings to provide a sketch of Weyl's philosophical orientation, following which I attempt to elucidate his views on the mathematical continuum, bringing out the essential role he assigned to intuition.
In the Preface to Dedekind (1888) we read that "In science, whatever is provable must not be believed without proof." This remark is certainly characteristic of the way most mathematicians think. Nevertheless, it is a preposterous principle. As if such an indirect concatenation of grounds, call it a proof though we may, can awaken any "belief" apart from assuring ourselves through immediate insight that each individual step is correct. In all cases, this process of confirmation-and not the proof-remains the ultimate source from which knowledge derives its authority; it is the "experience of truth". 3
In his short philosophical autobiography of 1954, Insight and Reflection, Weyl tells of the impact made on him as a schoolboy by a commentary on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." He was especially taken with Kant's doctrine that space and time are not inherent in the objects of the world, existing as such and independently of our awareness, but are, rather, conceptual forms or intuitions based in our intellects. And he goes on to quote Fichte-whose language he describes as "always a bit eccentric", but whose philosophic idealism was nevertheless to exert a considerable intellectual influence on him-
Transparent penetrable space, the purest image of my knowing, cannot be inspected but must be seen intuitively, and within it my inspecting itself is so seen. The light is not
outside of me, but rather in me. 4 Although Weyl was soon to abandon the greater part of Kant's doctrines, he cleaved always to the idea of the primacy of intuition that he had first learned from Kant.
On entering Göttingen University in 1904, Weyl read Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry. This tour-de-force of the axiomatic method, in comparison to which Kant's "bondage to Euclidean geometry" had come to seem naïve, greatly impressed Weyl, so much so that, as a result, under this overwhelming blow, the structure of Kantian philosophy, to which I had clung with faithful heart, crumbled into ruins. 5 After this phi;osophical debâcle Weyl lapsed into an indifferent positivism for a while. In 1912-13 his interest in philosophy was rekindled by his coming to learn of Husserl's phenomenology, to which he had been introduced by his wife, a student of Husserl's. It was also at about this time that Fichtean metaphysical idealism came to "capture his imagination."
Athirst for philosophy, Weyl cannot have been reluctant to abandon the aridities of positivism for the potential springs of phenomenology, whose goal he describes as ... to capture phenomena in their essential being-purely as they yield themselves apart from all genetical and other theories in the encounter with our consciousness. 6 Nevertheless, captivated by idealism as he was, Weyl seems not to have come to full acceptance of its central thesis that the external world exists, in the final analysis, only as an object of consciousness. More than once in his writings Weyl draws attention to the gap between immanent consciousness … and the concrete man that I am, who was born of a mother and will die. 7 In Weyl's eyes, the concrete individual, the bearer of consciousness, has as much claim to real existence as does consciousness itself.
In The Open World (1932), Weyl provides an eloquent formulation of his philosophical outlook, which quickly moves beyond its initial echoes of Schopenhauer: Although Weyl held that the roots of mathematics lay in the intuitively given as opposed to the transcendent, he recognized at the same time that it would be unreasonable to require all mathematical knowledge to possess intuitive immediacy. In Das Kontinuum, for example, he says:
The states of affairs with which mathematics deals are, apart from the very simplest ones, so complicated that it is practically impossible to bring them into full givenness in consciousness and in this way to grasp them completely. 10 But Weyl did not think that this fact furnished justification for extending the bounds of mathematics to embrace notions which cannot be given fully in intuition even in principle (e.g., the actual infinite). He held, rather, that this extension of mathematics into the transcendent is necessitated by the fact that mathematics plays an indispensable role in the physical sciences, in which intuitive evidence is necessarily transcended. The problem of identifying the limits on constructing "the possible" in this sense occupied Weyl a great deal. He was particularly concerned with the concept of the mathematical infinite, which he believed to elude "construction" in the idealized sense of set theory. Again to quote a passage from Das Kontinuum: 9 Weyl [1998a] , 140. 10 Weyl [1987] , 17. 11 Weyl [1932] , 82. 12 Weyl [1929] Another mathematical "possible" to which Weyl gave a great deal of thought is the idea of the continuum. During the period 1918-1921 he wrestled with the problem of providing it with an exact mathematical formulation free of the taint of the actual infinite. As he saw it in 1918, there is an unbridgeable gap between intuitively given continua (e.g. those of space, time and motion) on the one hand, and the "discrete" exact concepts of mathematics (e.g. that of real number) on the other. For Weyl the presence of this split meant that the construction of the mathematical continuum could not simply be read off" from intuition. Rather, he believed at this time that the mathematical continuum must be treated as if it were an element of the transcendent realm, and so, in the end, justified in the same way as a physical theory. In Weyl's view, it was not enough that the mathematical theory be consistent; it must also be reasonable.
Das Kontinuum embodies Weyl's attempt at formulating a theory of the continuum which satisfies the first, and, as far as possible, the second, of these requirements. In the following passages from this work he acknowledges the difficulty of the task:
... the conceptual world of mathematics is so foreign to what the intuitive continuum presents to us that the demand for coincidence between the two must be dismissed as absurd. 15 .
.. the continuity given to us immediately by intuition (in the flow of time and of motion) has yet to be grasped mathematically as a totality of discrete "stages" in accordance with that part of its content which can be conceptualized in an exact way. 16 Exact time-or space-points are not the ultimate, underlying atomic elements of the duration or extension given to us in experience. On the contrary, only reason, which thoroughly penetrates what is experientially given, is able to grasp these exact ideas. And only in the arithmetico-analytic concept of the real number belonging to the purely formal sphere do these ideas crystallize into full definiteness. 17
13 Weyl [1987] , 23.
14 Weyl [1932] , 83. 15 Weyl [1987] , 108. 16 Ibid., 24. In this connection it is of interest to note that Brentano, in his On What is Continuous of 1914, had drawn the similar conclusion that the continuum concept is derived from primitive sensible intuition and indeed that "all our sensible intuitions present us with that which is continuous." This led him to regard the constructions of the continuum of Dedekind, Cantor, and their successors as "fictions". 17 Ibid., 94.
When our experience has turned into a real process in a real world and our phenomenal time has spread itself out over this world and assumed a cosmic dimension, we are not satisfied with replacing the continuum by the exact concept of the real number, in spite of the essential and undeniable inexactness arising from what is given. 18
However much he may have wished to do so, in Das Kontinuum Weyl did not aim to provide a mathematical formulation of the continuum as it is presented to intuition, which, as the quotations above show, he regarded as an impossibility (at that time at least). Rather, his goal was first to achieve consistency by putting the arithmetical notion of real number on a firm logical basis, and then to show that the resulting theory is reasonable by employing it as the foundation for a plausible account of continuous process in the objective physical world. 19 As a practicing mathematician, Weyl had come to believe that, the work of Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor notwithstanding, mathematical analysis at the beginning of the 20 th century would not bear logical scrutiny, for its essential concepts and procedures involved vicious circles to such an extent that, as he says, "every cell (so to speak) of this mighty organism is permeated by contradiction." In Das Kontinuum he tries to overcome this by providing analysis with a predicative formulation-not, as Russell and Whitehead had attempted, by introducing a hierarchy of logically ramified types, which Weyl seems to have regarded as too complicated-but rather by confining the comprehension principle to formulas whose bound variables range over just the initial given entities (numbers). Thus he restricts analysis to what can be done in terms of natural numbers with the aid of three basic logical operations, together with the operation of substitution and the process of "iteration", i.e., primitive recursion. Weyl recognized that the effect of this restriction would be to render unprovable many of the central results of classical analysis-e.g., Dirichlet's principle that any bounded set of real numbers has a least upper bound 20 -but he was prepared to accept this as part of the price that must be paid for the security of mathematics.
In '6 of Das Kontinuum Weyl presents his conclusions as to the relationship between the intuitive and mathematical continua. He poses the question: Does the mathematical framework he has erected provide an adequate representation of physical or temporal continuity as it is actually experienced? He begins his investigation by noting that, according to his theory, if one asks whether a given function is continuous, the answer is not fixed once and for all, but is, rather, dependent on the extent of the domain of real numbers which have been defined up to the point at which the question is posed. Thus the continuity of a function must always remain provisional; the possibility always exists that a function deemed continuous now may, with the emergence of "new" real numbers, turn out to be discontinuous in the future. 21 18 Ibid., 93. 19 The connection between mathematics and physics was of course of paramount importance for Weyl. His seminal work on relativity theory, Space-Time-Matter, was published in the same year (1918) as Das Kontinuum; the two works show subtle affinities. 20 In this connection it is of interest to note that on 9 February 1918 Weyl and George Pólya made a bet in Zürich in the presence of twelve witnesses (all of whom were mathematicians) that "within 20 years, Pólya, or a majority of leading mathematicians, will come to recognize the falsity of the least upper bound property." When the bet was eventually called, everyonewith the single exception of Gödel-agreed that Pólya had won. 21 This fact would seem to indicate that in Weyl's theory the domain of definition of a function is not unambiguously determined by the function, so that the continuity of such a "function" may vary with its domain of definition. (This would be a natural consequence of Weyl's definition of a function as a certain kind of relation.) A simple but striking example of this phenomenon is provided in classical analysis by the function f which takes value 1 at each rational number, and 0 at each irrational number. Considered as a function defined on the rational numbers, f is constant and so continuous; as a function defined on the real numbers, To reveal the discrepancy between this formal account of continuity based on real numbers and the properties of an intuitively given continuum, Weyl next considers the experience of seeing a pencil lying on a In order to correlate mathematical concepts with phenomenal time in this sense Weyl grants the possibility of introducing a rigidly punctate "now" and of identifying and exhibiting the resulting temporal points. On the collection of these temporal points is defined the relation of earlier than as well as a congruence relation of equality of temporal intervals, the basic constituents of a simple mathematical theory of time. Now Weyl observes that the discrepancy between phenomenal time and the concept of real number would vanish if the following pair of conditions could be shown to be satisfied: 24 Condition 2 means that, if we take the time span OE as a unit, then each temporal point P is correlated with a definite real number. In an addendum Weyl also stipulates the converse.
But can temporal intuition itself provide evidence for the truth or falsity of these two conditions? Weyl thinks not. In fact, he states quite categorically that ... everything we are demanding here is obvious nonsense: to these questions, the intuition of time provides no answer-just as a man makes no reply to questions which clearly are addressed to him by mistake and, therefore, are unintelligible when addressed to him. 25 The grounds for this assertion are by no means immediately evident, but one gathers from the passages following it that Weyl regards the experienced continuous flow of phenomenal time as constituting an insuperable barrier to the whole enterprise of representing this continuum in terms of individual points, and even to the characterization of "individual temporal point" itself. As he says, 26 Weyl sums up what he thinks can be affirmed about "objectively presented time"-by which I take it he means "phenomenal time described in an objective manner"-in the following two assertions, which he claims apply equally, mutatis mutandis, to every intuitively given continuum, in particular, to the continuum of spatial extension:
The view of a flow consisting of points and, therefore, also dissolving into points turns out to be mistaken: precisely what eludes us is the nature of the continuity, the flowing from point to point; in other words, the secret of how the continually enduring present can continually slip away into the receding past. Each one of us, at every moment, directly experiences the true character of this temporal continuity. But, because of the genuine primitiveness of phenomenal time, we cannot put our experiences into words. So we shall content ourselves with the following description. What I am conscious of is for me both a being-now and, in its essence, something which, with its temporal position, slips away. In this way there arises the persisting factual extent, something ever new which endures and changes in consciousness.

An individual point in it is non-independent, i.e., is pure nothingness when taken by itself, and exists only as a "point of transition" (which, of course, can in no way be understood mathematically);
it is due to the essence of time (and not to contingent imperfections in our medium) that a fixed temporal point cannot be exhibited in any way, that always only an approximate, never an exact determination is possible. 27
The fact that single points in a true continuum "cannot be exhibited" arises, Weyl continues, from the fact that they are not genuine individuals and so cannot be characterized by their properties. In the physical world they are never defined absolutely, but only in terms of a coordinate system, which, in an arresting metaphor, Weyl describes as "the unavoidable residue of the eradication of the ego." This metaphor, which Weyl was to employ more than once (e.g. in Weyl [1950], 8 and [1963] , 123) reflects the continuing influence of phenomenological doctrine: in this case, the thesis that the existent is given in the first instance as the contents of a consciousness. Many years later, in Insight and Reflection, Weyl expanded this metaphor into a full-fledged analogy: this is described in the Appendix to the present paper.
By 1919 Weyl had come to embrace Brouwer's views on the intuitive continuum. The latter's influence looms large in Weyl's next paper on the subject, On the New Foundational Crisis of Mathematics, written in 1920. Here Weyl identifies two distinct views of the continuum: "atomistic" or "discrete"; and "continuous". In the first of these the continuum is composed of individual real numbers which are well-defined and can be sharply distinguished. Weyl describes his earlier attempt at reconstructing analysis in Das Kontinuum as atomistic in this sense:
Existential questions concerning real numbers only become meaningful if we analyze the concept of real number in this extensionally determining and delimiting manner. Through this conceptual restriction, an ensemble of individual points is, so to speak, picked out from the fluid paste of the continuum. The continuum is broken up into isolated elements, and the flowing-into-each other of its parts is replaced by certain conceptual relations between these elements, based on the "larger-smaller" relationship. This is why I speak of the atomistic conception of the continuum. 28
By this time Weyl had come to repudiate atomistic theories of the continuum, including that of Das Kontinuum. While intuitive considerations, together with Brouwer's influence, must certainly have fuelled Weyl's rejection of such theories, it also had a logical basis. For Weyl had come to regard as meaningless the formal procedure-employed in Das Kontinuum-of negating universal and existential statements concerning real numbers conceived as developing sequences or as sets of rationals. This had the effect of undermining the whole basis on which his theory had been erected, and at the same time rendered impossible the very formulation of a "law of excluded middle" for such statements. Thus Weyl found himself espousing a position 29 considerably more radical than that of Brouwer, for whom negations of quantified statements had a perfectly clear constructive meaning, under which the law of excluded middle is simply not generally affirmable.
Of existential statements Weyl says:
An existential statement-e.g., "there is an even number"-is not a judgement in the proper sense at all, which asserts a state of affairs; existential states of affairs are the empty invention of logicians. 30
Weyl termed such pseudostatements "judgement abstracts", likening them, with his unfailing flair, to "a piece of paper which announces the presence of a treasure, without divulging its location." Universal statements, although possessing greater substance than existential ones, are still mere intimations of judgements, "judgement instructions", for which Weyl provides the following metaphorical description:
If knowledge be compared to a fruit and the realization of that knowledge to the consumption of the fruit, then a universal statement is to be compared to a hard shell filled with fruit. It is, obviously, of some value, however, not as a shell by itself, but only for its
28 Weyl [1998] , 91. 29 Weyl's contention is strikingly similar to (and may have had an influence on) Hilbert's later assertion that "contentual" statements are, from the finitist standpoint, incapable of being negated. See, e.g., Hilbert [1926] , 378. 30 Weyl [1998] , 97.
content of fruit. It is of no use to me as long as I do not open it and actually take out a fruit and eat it. 31
Above and beyond the claims of logic, Weyl welcomed Brouwer's construction of the continuum by means of sequences generated by free acts of choice, thus identifying it as a "medium of free Becoming" which "does not dissolve into a set of real numbers as finished entities". Weyl felt that Brouwer, through his doctrine of Intuitionism 32 , had come closer than anyone else to bridging that "unbridgeable chasm" between the intuitive and mathematical continua. In particular, he found compelling the fact that the Brouwerian continuum is not the union of two disjoint nonempty parts-that it is, in a word, indecomposable. "A genuine continuum," Weyl says, "cannot be divided into separate fragments." In later publications he expresses this more colourfully by quoting Anaxagoras to the effect that a continuum "defies the chopping off of its parts with a hatchet."
Weyl also agrees with Brouwer that all functions everywhere defined on a continuum are continuous, but here certain subtle differences of viewpoint emerge. Weyl contends that what mathematicians had taken to be discontinuous functions actually consist of several continuous functions defined on separated continua. (For example, the "discontinuous" function defined by f(x) = 0 for x < 0 and f(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0 in fact consists of the two functions with constant values 0 and 1 respectively defined on the separated continua {x: x < 0} and {x: x ≥ 0}. The union of these two continua fails to be the whole of the real continuum because of the failure of the law of excluded middle: it is not the case that, for be any real number x, either x < 0 or x ≥ 0.) Brouwer, on the other hand, had not dismissed the possibility that discontinuous functions could be defined on proper parts of a continuum, and still seems to have been searching for an appropriate way of formulating this idea. 33 In particular, at that time Brouwer would probably have been inclined to regard the above function f as a genuinely discontinuous function defined on a proper part of the real continuum. For Weyl, it seems to have been a self-evident fact that all functions defined on a continuum are continuous, but this is because Weyl confines attention to functions which turn out to be continuous by definition. Brouwer's concept of function is less restrictive than Weyl's and it is by no means immediately evident that such functions must always be continuous.
Weyl defined real functions as mappings correlating each interval in the choice sequence determining the argument with an interval in the choice sequence determining the value "interval by interval" as it were, the idea being that approximations to the input of the function should lead effectively to corresponding approximations to the input. Such functions are continuous by definition. Brouwer, on the other hand, considers real functions as correlating choice sequences with choice sequences, and the continuity of these is by no means obvious. The fact that Weyl refused to grant (free) choice sequences-whose identity is in no way predetermined-sufficient individuality to admit them as arguments of functions perhaps betokens a commitment to the conception of the continuum as a "medium of free Becoming" even deeper than that of Brouwer.
There thus being only minor differences between Weyl's and Brouwer's accounts of the continuum, Weyl accordingly abandoned his earlier attempt at the reconstruction of analysis and "joined Brouwer." At the same time, however, Weyl recognized that the resulting gain in intuitive clarity had been bought at a considerable price, as witnessed by his remark in the 1927 edition of Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science: It seems to me a great pity that Weyl did not live to see the emergence in the 1970s of smooth infinitesimal analysis 36 , a mathematical framework within which his vision of a true continuum, not "synthesized" from discrete elements, is realized. Although the underlying logic of smooth infinitesimal analysis is intuitionistic-the law of excluded middle not being generally affirmable-mathematics developed within avoids the "unbearable awkwardness" to which Weyl refers above. And while it unquestionably falls within the compass of "symbolic construction", as opposed to immediate intuition, I believe that the simple and elegant way in which it gives expression to the indecomposability of the continuum and to the automatic continuity of functions defined thereon would have been recognized by Weyl as creating a natural bridge between the continua of intuition and formal mathematics. Moreover, smooth infinitesimal analysis embodies a notion of infinitesimal quantity making possible the development a truly infinitesimal physics, something which Weyl would surely have welcomed. 37 It seems appropriate to conclude with the passage, from a review paper of 1946, in which Weyl summarizes the effect that the problem of foundations had had on his own work:
This history should make one thing clear: we are less certain than ever work about the ultimate foundations of (logic and) 
Appendix.
Weyl's Analogy between Egos and Coordinate Systems.
In Weyl [1969] , an analogy is presented between coordinate systems and egos, which Weyl here refers to as "subjects". In this analogy objects, subjects, and the appearance of an object to a subject are correlated respectively with points on a plane, (barycentric) coordinate systems in the plane, and coordinates of a point with respect to a such a coordinate system. In Weyl's analogy, a coordinate system S consists of the vertices of a fixed nondegenerate triangle T; each point p in the plane determined by T is assigned a triple of numbers summing to 1-its barycentric coordinates relative to S-representing the magnitudes of masses of total weight 1 which, placed at the vertices of T, have centre of gravity at p. Thus objects, i.e. points, and subjects i.e., coordinate systems or triples of points belong to the same "sphere of reality." On the other hand, the appearances of an object to a subject, i.e., triples of numbers, lie, Weyl asserts, in a different sphere, that of numbers. These number-appearances, as Weyl calls them, correspond to the experiences of a subject, or of pure consciousness.
From the standpoint of naïve realism the points (objects) simply exist as such, but Weyl indicates the possibility of constructing geometry (which under the analogy corresponds to external reality) solely in terms of number-appearances, so representing the world in terms of the experiences of pure consciousness, that is, from the standpoint of idealism. Thus suppose that we are given a coordinate system S. Regarded as a subject or "consciousness", from its point of view a point or object now corresponds to what was originally an appearance of an object, that is, a triple of numbers summing to 1; and, analogously, any coordinate system S′ (that is, another subject or "consciousness") corresponds to three such triples determined by the vertices of a nondegenerate triangle. Each point or object p may now be identified with its coordinates relative to S. The coordinates of p relative to any other coordinate system S′ can be determined by a straightforward algebraic transformation: these coordinates represent the appearance of the object corresponding to p to the subject represented by S′. Now these coordinates will, in general, differ from those assigned to p by our given coordinate system S, and will in fact coincide for all p if and only if S′ is what is termed by Weyl the absolute coordinate system consisting of the three triples (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1), that is, the coordinate system which corresponds to S itself. Thus, for this coordinate system, "object" and "appearance" coincide, which leads Weyl to term it the Absolute I. 39 Weyl points out that this argument takes place entirely within the realm of numbers, that is, for the purposes of the analogy, the immanent consciousness. In order to do justice to the claim of objectivity that all "I"s are equivalent, he suggests that only such numerical relations are to be declared of interest as remain unchanged under passage from an "absolute" to an arbitrary coordinate system, that is, those which are invariant under arbitrary linear coordinate transformations. When this scheme is given a purely axiomatic formulation, Weyl sees a third viewpoint emerging in addition to that of realism and idealism, namely, a transcendentalism which "postulates a transcendental reality but is satisfied with modelling it in symbols." 40 39 This phrase Weyl derives from Fichte, whom he quotes as follows:
The I demands that it comprise all reality and fill up infinity. This demand is based, as a matter of necessity, on the idea of the infinite I; this is the absolute I (which is not the I given in real awareness. 40 But Weyl, ever-sensitive to the claims of subjectivity, goes on to say that this scheme does not resolve the enigma of selfhood. In this connection he refers to Leibniz's attempt to resolve the conflict between human freedom and divine predestination by having God select for Interestingly, by the time this was written, Weyl seems to have moved away somewhat from the phenomenology that originally suggested the geometric analogy. For he asserts that a number of Husserl's theses become "demonstratively false" when translated into the context of the analogy, "something which," he opines, "gives serious cause for suspecting them." Unfortunately, he does not specify which of Husserl's theses he has in mind.
